The Never Ending Democratization of the Philippines 89 has expanded into the civilian bodies of the government. It was not very difcult for military leaders to see that Marcos depended on the armed forces for the continued survival of his authoritarian rule. It was not also difcult for the military leaders to infer that they themselves, even without Marcos, could also employ the same military force and install a military junta. Indeed history has many examples of military leaders who grabbed political power from the civilian leaders. Perhaps Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte are the most well-known among them. The military adventurism in our country can be seen in this light, although admittedly, there are other important specic reasons behind this phenomenon in our democratic transition (The Final Report of the (Davide) Fact-Finding Commission October 1990: 16-19). The military had grown accustomed to the privileges showered on it and played a crucial role in politics.
Its interventionist tendency has made it the gatekeeper in the extraconstitutional transfer of Presidential power from Estrada to Arroyo when it withdrew its support from Estrada. Moreover, recent incidents of military adventurism indicate that the military has not returned and stayed in the barracks. These incidents include the Oakwood mutiny in 2003, the break with the chain of command of some Marines and Scout Ranger units in 2006, and the 2007 attempt of the rebellious soldiers with some civil society personalities to dramatize their demand for President Arroyo to resign. The proclamation of a state of emergency in 2006 and the government's warrantless arrests are reminders of the potency of the military power against civil and political liberties. The institutionalization of the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military continues to be a formidable challenge of the postEDSA transition to substantive democracy. In the Senate hearings on the plea bargaining agreement between the Ombudsman and retired Major General Carlos Garcia, it was revealed that the budget item called Provisions for Command Directed Activities is under the control of the chief of staff (Testimony of Retired Lt. Col. George Rabusa, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing on the Plea Bargain Agreement with Retired Major General Carlos Garcia, January 27, 2011). From 2000 to 2002, this item came from the unused funds for salaries of personnel of the armed forces and UN funds for Philippine peacekeeping units. These funds were “converted” into intelligence fund which is exempt from auditing. This converted fund was used for questionable purposes like the “pasalubong” and “pabaon”, including the unauthorized monthly allowances for the chief of staff and other ofcials of the armed forces (Ibid). Rabusa said that “pasalubong” is the cash gift for the incoming chief-of-staff, while “pabaon” is the cash gift for the outgoing chiefof-staff. These cash gifts ranged from PHP 10 million to 120 million. The unilateral power of the President to proclaim martial law in the 1935 Constitution has been limited by the 1987 Constitution. Many members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission were evidently conscious of what they