activities thereat. As can be gleaned from Attachment “A” to the 29 October 2015 position paper of Maj. Gen. Valencia, from February to September 2014, there were eight abandoned NPA encampments26 discovered by the military in the course of five combat operations, one pursuit operation, and one combat clearing operation. From January to August 2015, nine abandoned enemy encampments/camps27 were discovered in the course of seven combat operations, one focus military operation, and one combat clearing operation. 16. The foregoing facts not only speak of military presence, but also of militarization, justifiably in response to massive NPA activities thereat. The military response was in the form of combat operations, and combat clearing operations in certain areas in the municipalities of Talaingod and Kapalong. The implementation of the Peace and Development Outreach Program (PDOP) by the military in said areas, while primarily aimed to bring basic services and development in said communities, were intended to counter insurgency, with the end view of winning back those in the insurgency movement to the folds of the government. 17. Militarization in ancestral domains as a counter-insurgency strategy is employed with the intention of not only counteracting NPA presence, but of quelling people’s movements and civil society organizations in them, as well. The AFP considers certain CSOs as “the political infrastructure of the revolution and the NPA’s intelligence network” and that “attacking them is designed to blind the NPA and undermine the CPP’s political progress.”28 NPA groups do not stay in one area and may or may not be present when the AFP deploys its own presence there. Military presence is a deterrent to rebel presence in the same space. 18. It is the same thing with paramilitary presence. This much is strongly suggested in the testimony of Lito Sampag, alleging that fellow Lumad were recruited by the military to join the Alamara and to fight the NPA. However, according to him, the real targets of the Alamara are not the nonIP insurgents, but fellow Lumad suspected of being NPA sympathizers or members.29 19. The Commission makes reference to a published report30 of the International Federation for Human Rights and World Organization Against Torture, 26 One abandoned enemy encampment in Sitio Taongatok, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong, on Feb. 1, 2014; two in Sitio Mangkay, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on 2 February 2015; two in Brgy. Palma Gil, Talaingod on March 6, 2015, and another one on April 4, 2015; and one in Sitio Aninipot, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on Aug. 7, 2015; and one in Sitio Ocampina, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong. 27 One abandoned enemy encampment in Sitio, Aninipot, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on Jan. 23, 2015; one in Sitio Lumban, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on March 1, 2015; one in Sitio Baho, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on March 3, 2015; one in Sitio Pongpong, Brgy. Dagohoy, Talaingod on March 4, 2015; one in Sitio Aninipot, Brgy. Gupitan, Kapalong on Aug. 1, 2015; two in Sitio Bolo, Brgy. Dagohoy, Talaingod on Aug. 18 and 19, 2015; and two in Sitio Bato, Brgy. Dagohoy, Talaingod on Aug. 20 and 21, 2015. 28 Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Mission to Philippines. A/ HRC/8/3/Add.2 16, April 2008 29 Joint Affidavit of Lito Sampag, Dodong Malibato, Alvin Malibato and Jinky Malibato, 7 September 2015. 30 International Federation for Human Rights and World Organisation Against Torture, The Philippines Human Rights Defenders at The Forefront Despite an Ongoing Culture of Violence and Impunity: International Fact-Finding Mission Report, February 2015, available at http://www.omct.org/files/2015/07/23254/v1.3_en_w_rpprtphilippines_obs15.pdf. 8