｜ The better way to handle this is to further subcategorize the speech in question: If the actor is selfcensoring or unwilling to provoke China, their speech can only be regarded as general political speech. Conversely, under certain circumstances, when China wants a specific industry to express a uniform stance on a specific issue, there may be interventions and demands from the United Front Work Department and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members. If such demands come to light, then the speech can be regulated by disclosing the cash flow. The final type of manipulation is even more complicated. I call it “using money to shape the speech market”. Take the online streamers that are popular these days, for example. The first two categories of information manipulation can all be regulated to an extent. The best way to sidestep these regulations is through donations. For example, a streamer might get lots of donations when they speak in favor of China. Since neither the streaming platform nor the streamer can control who makes donations, it cannot be used as a method to control speech. However, this has resulted in many people entering the streaming market eager to “say good things about China”. These streamers don’t even need to think about how to please China. All they need to do is look up examples on China’s database to easily bring in revenue. On the surface, the streamer would appear to have nothing to do with China. I have uncovered content farms and new YouTube streaming models that use this kind of cognitive manipulation techniques. However, the disclosure of money cannot enable any control for this kind of 164 investment method, because it is already okay to take donations on open online platforms. Therefore, unless the platforms establish new policies, there are no ways to battle this type of information manipulation under the premise of safeguarding free speech. 3. Ideology-driven The final way of cognitive warfare has nothing to do with money. It is the oldest United Front playbook of cognitive manipulation. For example, China may encourage the establishment of local group chats for people who are already ideologically close to China. Then, when China spreads information to these groups, these people will automatically become disseminators of fake news. When researching Russia’s information warfare tactics, scholars often point out how social media were weaponized. Now, China is weaponizing “people” instead. China attracts extremists or people with complaints against the government, using them to amplify controversial issues in the country, thereby causing cognitive bias among the people to create or amplify social opposition and hatred. However, this kind of absorbing and re-distributing information through ideology is protected by freedom of speech unless there is false information involved. Actors cannot be controlled or punished under the current framework of safeguarding free speech. The Effectiveness of Taiwan’s Response We can see how it is hard to directly control or punish behaviors of cognitive warfare. This is because the fact that these tactics are hard to regulate is precisely why the attackers have chosen them. As Chapter 5 a democratic country, we naturally can’t respond to these attacks with the existing structure because such tactics target the weakness of democratic countries. As we enjoy freedom of speech, we must not change the rules of democracy (or free speech) for the sake of information warfare, or we will be no different than a dictatorship. In this regard, I believe that we can defend against misinformation with a victim-oriented approach. In other words, instead of controlling speech or punishing actors, we can help victims who might have been manipulated to become familiar with China’s tactics. By avoiding regulations and punishments, we can avoid bolstering the mistrust these people already have towards society. Through events and workshops, we should let everyone understand that, in a democratic country, we can have different opinions but not hate one another. That under the framework of freedom of speech, we should give each other opportunities to debate different ideas or take a break from debating. That no matter how tough the circumstances, we should be willing to communicate with one another because Taiwan is a country governed by democracy and the rule of law. If we proceed in this direction, the current response plan should not only emphasize and respond to fake news but also address the “motivations” for people to believe in false information, and strengthen national defense education to keep people on guard. From a national security standpoint, Taiwan usually only responds to news about PLA fighter jets circling the island instead of clarifying fake news. This is the right approach to take. Unless there is an immediate danger or a cognitive attack against soldiers ｜ Continual Improvement: Keeping Up with International Trends that needs to be responded to, the government should positively emphasize its measures to protect the people, instead of flagging and punishing those who relay information. For example, the government collects people’s data for epidemic prevention purposes. Seizing this opportunity, China can spread misinformation like “the Taiwanese government is improperly collecting citizens’ data to monitor and control them”. If the government punishes those who pass on such information or emphasizes that it is false information, it will not only make those who believed the rumors even more convinced of their validity, but also alienate people from the government, which is playing right into China’s hand. A better approach would be to stress that “this type of information is being spread because the people have doubts and mistrust about how the government collects information, and the government understands these concerns. To address these concerns, the government will establish a third-party supervisory institution to make sure the information is not misused, establish a clear system of responsibilities, and ensure that the information will be deleted at a certain date.” This approach not only shows empathy for the “victims” influenced by cognitive warfare but also brings society closer together. Solving the problem from the perspective of the victims allows the government to protect the framework of free speech, respond to the threat that cognitive warfare poses on democracy, and strengthen Taiwan’s status as a bastion of free speech. 165