｜ For a long time, groups representing China would put up flags of the PRC in the square in front of Taipei 101 in attempt to create the illusion that Taiwan is a part of China. They would even bully the Falun Gong group that also promotes its ideologies at the square. Photographer: Huang Yen-wen Taiwan recklessly makes the information spread from China part of a war, it would risk infringing people’s freedom of speech. When China knows this and is spreading a massive amount of controversial information, how Taiwan should respond under the framework of free speech becomes a difficult challenge. After all, democratic countries must allow diverse opinions, so even biased information may be protected by freedom of speech. As the concept of defensive democracy becomes increasingly prevalent, we must address the conflict between these types of threats and the concept of democracy. 162 The Conflict Between China’s Cognitive Warfare Tactics and Freedom of Speech Based on data and general research on China’s “united front” strategy, I’ve compiled descriptions of China’s cognitive warfare tactics, with which I will discuss the boundary of free speech. 1. Direct information manipulation Direct information manipulation from China can generally be divided into two types. The first is information from the central propaganda system, which is usually disseminated through official media, ambas- Chapter 5 sadors, and official or specific Weibo accounts. This government-related information is usually not difficult to deal with. It is mostly just setting the tone for China’s general stance. Because there is a clear source, immediate threats can be prevented as long as the source is clearly labeled for the Taiwanese public to see. There is no need to further restrict such content, lest it leads to misunderstandings about censorship. The second type of direct information manipulation are spread by the “Little Pink”. This information consists mostly of lower-level rumors. The Little Pink often try to influence public opinion by “going to war” online, to little success. Even though they are often spurred into action by organizations like the Communist Youth League of China, these operations have very limited effects. Because those spreading such rumors are usually abroad and out of the jurisdiction of our legal system, the rational way to handle them is to expose them. This way also will not involve censorship. The ones that are truly problematic are the online accounts that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have lying in wait for a long time, ready to troll, attack or incite conflict at key moments. There is no better way to deal with this type of manipulation than to combat it head on. 2. Investment This kind of cognitive manipulation is more complicated. Is is mainly done through economic incentives to dominate public opinion, thereby gaining the upper hand in battles of public opinion or legal battles. This type of manipulation can be divided into three categories. The first category is direct investment, such as directly paying public relations firms in target countries to manipulate information on specific issues. China ｜ Continual Improvement: Keeping Up with International Trends might also directly invest in KOLs and ask them to put out content that is favorable about China or unfavorable about the West, which can shake people’s confidence in other democratic countries and bolster trust in China. Since the cash flow can be traced, the appropriate response to such tactics is to strengthen the disclosure and control of the cash flow. In other words, information spreaders who are paid by China to disseminate certain information should disclose this in the speech itself so that the audience understands that they are listening to content sponsored by China. This is like how general sponsorship deals must be disclosed (regulation of commercial speech). This method does not involve the censorship of speech and only discloses whether money or benefits are received. This method is in the same vein as the US Foreign Agents Registration Act. For the attacking party, however, it is also easy to bypass these measures. For example, China has long invested in many causes (such as the performing arts) that have nothing to do with the direct dissemination of information. The many people who benefit from China in this way do not need to serve the Chinese government. In key moments, however, China will likely ask these people (such as artists furthering their careers in China) to ‘take a stance”. This can influence many people who had no previous interest in politics. Regarding indirect investments like this, since China did not directly finance manipulated narratives, there is no point in disclosing the cash flow. However, this type of cognitive warfare already touches the boundaries of freedom of speech, even though it is difficult to directly identify it as part of China’s information warfare just because the actors have gained a lot of benefits in China. 163