73 and it was North Korean women who filled this gap. When Hyeon Changhui (2009, 2-6) arrived at an unknown house after crossing the Tumen River and walking over the mountains, the male owner suggested: “He said that now we are in China, and there are two sons in this house who have not been able to get married, one son who has reached his 40s and one son aged 38, so if possible I should stay with them”. Soon, North Korean women were sold off to Chinese single men or widowers or were offered to adult entertainment establishments for money.34 Thus, for many North Korean women migration to China was caused by a ‘demand’ for them in Chinese society. In other words, the three north-eastern provinces of China exert a strong ‘pull force’ on North Korean women who are confronted with difficulties to survive in North Korea. Nevertheless, from a migration perspective, much bigger than the pull force applied by the Chinese and other external societies to North Korean women was the ‘push force’ exerted by the North Korean system. This force ‘pushing North Korean women out’ is closely related to prescribed ‘gender roles’ in North Korea which regard the provision of food and responsibilities relating to the livelihood of families as falling into the domain of women. Although in the years immediately following the Korean war when the male workforce was diminished the North Korean leadership propagated men and women as the ‘two cart wheels moving society forward’, sparked women’s societal participation and efficiently used the female workforce, at all times women were abandoned by the state when it came to changing the order of gender roles within the family. Hence, in socialist North Korea the traditionally prescribed gender roles did not change greatly. As long as they were single, North Korean women went out into society and worked, but as married women their responsibilities as ‘housewives’ were prioritized, so that it was not regarded as much of a problem if they did not go to work. 34 In 1999 women were traded for 3000 Chinese Yuan per person. As this price increased the more you went inland, there were also cases of women being traded for 15,000 Chinese Yuan per person. This constitutes a sum which is higher than the annual income that Chinese villagers could raise from their farming activities. Cases of villagers giving up farming and taking up human trafficking as a side-job increased (Gang, Sujin. Past and Present of the Problem of Human Trafficking of North Korean Refugee Women Residing in China and the Role of North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea. Lives for Sale. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. )